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SLOT EXCHANGE AND PURCHASE PLANNING
OF SHORT SEA SERVICES FOR LINER
CARRIERS
Hua-An Lu*, Shu-Ling Chen**, and Peter Lai***
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ABSTRACT
In a slot exchange co-operation, participating carriers seek
to benefit in which their surplus of controlled capacities can be
shared to exchange slots belong to partners for their shortages.
To each participant, whether the exchanged conditions can
bring more benefits is based on its slot allocation planning.
This paper introduces a practical slot exchange contract for
multiple short sea loops between two co-operative carriers.
Two integer programming models for maximizing the concerned profits are proposed to satisfy the expected demand
level and shipping properties. One of the models merely
considers slot exchange as the practical planning, and the other
one includes slot purchase additionally. Decision results can
assist the studied company to pursue an optimal allocation
with consideration of exchanged slots for the involved lines.
Moreover, sensitivity analyses including fixed exchanged condition, swap allowance influence, and purchase price assessment are carried out for measuring the impact of relevant
variables to the profits.

I. INTRODUCTION
In contemporary liner shipping industry, alliance cooperation has been a popular approach adopted by carriers for
extending service scopes and/or reducing investment risks.
Concrete means of collaboration like joint fleet, slot charter,
slot purchase, and slot exchange are normally employed in
practice. This research focuses on a real-world case of slot
exchange among short sea services. Slot exchange allows
participating carriers to use the recognized capacities of the
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involved lines not operated by own self, according to the
contents of the agreement. In such co-operation, participating
carriers expect to benefit in which their surplus of controlled
slots can be shared to exchange capacities for their shortages.
Accordingly, the exchanged condition must have a fair and
reciprocal calculation among the involved lines between participants. If the number of exchanged slots cannot satisfy a
carrier’s estimated demand, extra available slots could be purchased from its partner as long as the deal is accepted by all of
them. For fulfilling the benefit from the alliance contract as
expectation, the carrier has to make an ideal slot allocation
plan to understand the proposal of exchanged conditions. This
research explores how to construct a beneficial proposal for
the participating carrier.
The co-operative structures among liner companies began
from conferences and consortia to the recent strategic alliances.
Several studies have been devoted on the strategic alliances
from different perspectives such as the exploration of cooperative purpose [7], motivations and successful reasons [14],
and the main driving factors to yield the high degree of instabilities in the beginning of strategic alliances [12]. It was
found that the obvious changes in the operations of liner shipping companies because of strategic alliances were the service
networks and fleet composition and deployment [13, 16].
Slot allocation management is closely linked to container
delivery that includes container movement control and empty
container repositioning either sea services [2, 4, 8, 9, 15] or
inland transports [3, 6, 10]. However, the availability of
seaborne container movement depends on the planning of
enough slot capacities. A few studies have treated the distribution of slot resources with the concept of revenue management or yield management for single port pair [5, 11], but
this method fits for applying to the short-term planning before
ship visiting during each voyage. Recently, Ang et al. [1]
presented a yield maximization problem in considering cargos
with various consigned periods from one port of origin to
multiple ports of destinations. They formulated this problem
as a multi-dimensional multiple knapsack model limited by
the available empty containers, volume capacities and weight
capacities. This research can only apply to the outbound slots
distribution for a loading port.
To the best of our current knowledge, there is no description
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and formulation for practical slot exchange planning and alliance slot allocation. Ting and Tzeng [18] described the slot
allocation problem of a liner service and proposed an integer
programming model to obtain ideal allocated results for single
directional traffic flows. This model can be only conducted on
the case with the characteristics of the traffic pattern like an
ocean-going service. Song and Panayides [17] suggested
observing the operations of liner shipping strategic alliances
from a co-operative game theory. They presented the simple
examples for assessing the better coalition services in the cases
of two players and more than two. Nevertheless, this conceptual introduction cannot provide the carrier a concrete
planning procedure or structure applied to the practice yet.
In terms of the introduction of a practical case of slot exchange contract between two co-operative carriers, this study
proposes two optimized allocation models stood at the viewpoint of one of participating carriers. The first model merely
considers the slot exchange as the terms in the contract, while
another one includes the allowance of slot purchase to satisfy
the studied carrier’s expectation. These two models can assess
the level of concerned income under given part of information
of its partners. The rest of this paper will introduce the treated
problem in the next section, and then the contents and explanation of formulated models are followed. The assessment
and parameter analysis of the considered case, which involves
in total eight short sea services within Asia, will be reported
from the viewpoint of the studied carrier. The final section
concludes the findings and provides some suggestions for the
future research.

II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Slot exchange programs can be simple as conducting on a
single loop of each carrier or complicated to involve multiple
lines for each other. A simple case may just exchange slots
one by one, but a complicated one may contain many routes
with different service conditions. Ocean-going services are
arranged for delivering transoceanic consignment. The service conditions on the market, like container transit time between port to port, deployed vessel types and main visiting
ports, are normally similar among shipping lines. The slot
exchange conditions may be simple to merely swap fixed
number of slots for each other. On the other hand, short sea
services seem more flexible in round trip voyage, cycle time,
deployed vessel types and port rotation because their service
scopes tend to cover more countries than transoceanic routes.
These differences lead slot exchange conditions among short
sea services more complicated than the ocean-going services.
In any case, the most important thing for participants is to
assess whether slot allocation of vessels can satisfy the expected carrying quantities within the scope of involved lines.
The studied company has been operating global container
liner services for many years. This company sustained cooperative relationships with its strategic alliance partners
through joint fleet and slot exchange. In order to intensify

Table 1. Service scopes and conditions for involved routes
in the contract.
Line

Route and port rotation

A1 Japan/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Thailand:
JPTYOJPYOKJPNGOJPOSAJPUKB
JPOITTWKELTWKHHHKHKGTHLCB
THBKKHKHKGTWKHHTWTXG
TWKELJPTYO

Cycle time
(days)
28

A2 Japan/South Korea/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Singapore/
Indonesia:
JPMOJJPHKTKRPUSKRKWYTWKEL
TWTXGTWKHHHKHKGSGSINIDJKT
IDSUBHKHKGTWKHHTWTXGJPMOJ

28

A3 Taiwan/Philippines:
TWKHHTWKELPHMNSPHMNNTWKHH

7

B4 Japan/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Thailand:
JPTYOJPYOKJPNGOJPOSAJPUKB
TWKELTWTXGTWKHHHKHKG
THLCBTHBKKTHLCBHKHKG
TWKHHTWKELJPTYO

28

B5 China/Hong Kong/Philippines/Indonesia:
CNTAOCHSHAHKHKGPHMNN
PHMNSIDJKTIDSUBCNTAO

28

B6 Japan/South Korea/Taiwan/Hong Kong:
JPOSAJPUKBJPTYOJPMOJKRPUS
KRKWYTWKELTWKHHHKHKGJPOSA

14

B7 China/Hong Kong/Philippines/Thailand:
CNNGBCNSHAHKHKGPHMNS
THLCBTHBKKCNNGB

21

B8 Japan/Taiwan/Hong Kong/Vietnam:
JPNGOJPTYOJPYOKTWKELTWKHH
HKHKGVNSGNVNIHVHKHKGJPNGO
Source: the studied company

21

intra Asia services, the studied company also had some other
co-operation with regional liner companies. This study focuses on a slot exchange contract between the studied company and one of its long-term partners, a local carrier providing some liner services within Asia. Their contract maintained
a term of six months period. The exchanged conditions were
reassessed for renewal before expiration. The data in this
contract is collected for this research.
The contract between the studied company, denoted as Company A, and its partner, denoted as Company B, includes eight
weekly service loops. Company A operates three of them and
Company B operates the rest. These routes cover 24 ports in
nine main countries within Asia (shown in Table 1). Although
parts of the involved routes have same port rotation, A1 and
B4, two companies enforced their service frequency in the
indicated service scope through their alliance contract.
Without considering the transhipment of containers, this study
focuses on direct trade markets (or port pairs) in each loop.
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Table 2. Deployed ships and shared slots of involved routes
in the contract.
Number
Main
of
Line
operator
deployed
ships

Contributed ships Shared slots (TEUs)
Contract
slots of a
Company Company Company Company
ship
A
B
A
B
(TEUs)

A1
Company
A2
A
A3

4
4

1100
1100

4
4

0
0

1100
1100

0
0

1

1100

1

0

1100

0

B4

4

1100

1

3

275

825

B5
Company
B6
B
B7

4

1100

1

3

275

825

2

1100

0

2

0

1100

3

850

0

3

0

850

750

2

1

500

250

3
B8
Source: the studied company

There are 208 direct trades in total carried by Company A.
These direct trade markets excludes consignments between
domestic ports in some countries due to a cabotage limitation
for foreign carriers to ship domestic cargoes.
According to the cycle time of each line, various numbers
of ships are deployed on these lines for fulfilling their operational requirement of fixed weekly calls. It is noted that
both companies have adopted joint fleet mode on three lines
of Company B already, under another contract. As shown in
Table 2, the slot share of each company corresponding to each
line is calculated by multiplying contract slots of a ship by the
ratio of respective number of contributed ships to total number
of deployed ships. Both companies can use controllable capacities as a counter in the planning of slot exchanges.
All of involved routes have a variety of service contents
with cycle times, scopes, and ship types and quantities. These
dissimilarities imply that deploying capital and operating costs
of each line could be different. Hence, it could hardly show
the exact worth of slots on each line if the total number of exchanged slots was employed in the contract as an exchanged
term. For this concern, both companies agreed to exploit a
particular unit, namely TEU-day (TEU is twenty-foot equivalent unit of a standard container size), as the exchanged conditions, rather than using the total number of exchanged slots
directly. The exchanged TEU-days for an alliance route are
calculated by the product of the number of slots exchanged to
partner and the cycle time in days of this service route. It is
noted that the sum of exchanged TEU-days for all involved
lines should be, therefore, equal for each company. Although
the cycle time of a route cannot sufficiently represent the
whole value of input resources, it is a simple way and also one
of the important factors affecting the deploying costs of a service route.
According to the term of current slot exchange contract, both
companies exchanged 19,250 TEU-days each other. In total,
Company A swapped slots of 755 TEUs from its operating
three lines for 875 TEUs of Company B’s five operating lines.
The total number of TEU-days is even for both companies as
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Table 3. Slot exchanges in the current contract.
Main
operator

Company
A

Company
B

Current controlled
Slots exchanged
slot (TEUs)
to partner
TEU-days
Company
Company
(TEUs)
A
B

Line

Cycle time
(Days)

A1

28

425

11,900

A2

28

240

A3
7
Total TEUs &
TEU-days

90
755

19,250

675

425

6,720

860

240

630

1010

90

B4

28

275

7,700

550

450

B5

28

125

3,500

400

700

B6

14

275

3,850

275

825

B7

21

100

2,100

100

750

100

2,100

600

150

875

19,250

B8
21
Total TEUs &
TEU-days
Source: the studied company

shown in Table 3. The final two columns in this Table present
controlled slots of both companies after exchange. Besides the
original shared capacities from the join fleet contract, Company A obtained more slots to be used on routes B4, B5 and B8
by the exchange contract.

III. MODEL FORMULATION
A proper slot exchange plan for a carrier aims to meet estimated demand levels and liner operational properties through
effective slot allocation. From an individual company’s standpoint, this paper proposes models for slot exchange planning
and combining it with slot purchase. Without considering
transhipment, this study focuses on direct trade markets (i.e.
port pairs that can be finished seaborne carriage on a service
route) in each loop as the concerns of the studied carrier. It
is assumed that the range of demand quantities in each direct
trade market is known and represented by lower and upper
bounds. Moreover, we assume that the upper bounds of partner’s available exchanges and possible shortages on each route
are known in modelling. These parameters can be further
explored their influences against the optimal decision with
sensitivity analysis. Before introducing the formulated models, the first subsection describes a vital concept relative to the
representation of the relationships between direct trade markets and sailing legs of each route.
1. Route-Market-Leg Relationships
At the planning period, the carrier is hardly to estimate the
cargo mix for their consignment. To simplify cargo types by
containers sizes, like 20-foot and 40-foot boxes, and/or special
kinds of containers, such as reefer and out-of-gauge ones,
becomes a popular way to estimate relative parameters. This
alternative means each size of containers on the same market
has homogeneous volume, weight and price in a long-term
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3-1 4-3

1-2

1-3

:

:

r
) for the
Table 4. Route-market-leg relation matrix ( α ms
illustrated example.

2-1 4-1
:

:
:

:

1-4

4-3

port 1
:

port 2

port 2

:

1-3 2-3 2-4

4-2 4-1 4-3
:
:

:

:

:

:

3-2

3-1

:

:

port 4

1-4

4-3

:

:

port 3
3-1 3-2 3-4 2-4 1-4
:

:

:

:

:

Fig. 1. Containers shipped on board for the illustrated example.

planning level. A liner can carry containers for all of trade
markets among calling ports in a service route. However, its
port rotation is unlikely able to provide non-stop deliveries for
all port pair trades. Containers should be kept on board when
the ship calls at other non-destination ports. This practice
implies that some slots of the vessel may have been occupied
by those transit freights loaded at previous port calls. Ideally,
the vessel should be fully loaded at every sailing leg to achieve
maximal utilization of slot capacities, but shipping company
is unlikely to control shipments to meet such expectation in
practice. According to the port rotation of a loop, the carried
passages of consignments for every direct trade market can be
acquired a priori from the load planning. These paths are
normally arranged as the shortest one with minimal transit
time due to market competition.
At the case with only one route, a market-leg relation parameter, α ms, with value of 1 or 0 defined as whether the delivery passage of consignments of direct trade market m
passing the sailing leg s or not, 1 stands for yes and 0 otherwise. A round trip voyage with a port rotation 1-2-3-4-2-1 is
illustrated here to depict the slot occupied relationships between trade markets and sailing legs as shown in Fig. 1. This
example has 5 sailing legs for 5 calls and serves 12 port pairs
because of visiting 4 different ports. It is clear that the carried
containers of trade from port 2 to port 4, for example, have to
occupy the slots of legs 2-3 and 3-4. The value of corresponding market-leg relation parameters, α (2,4),(2,3) and α (2,4),(3,4), will
be 1, and others are 0. The relationships for other markets and
legs can be easily found.
Extending market-leg relationships to multiple routes, the
r
route-market-leg relation parameter could be redefined as α ms
by adding an index of route r. It represents whether the consignments of direct trade market m can be shipped by route r
and pass leg s or not, 1 for yes and 0 otherwise. Besides the
first route, another loop with rotation 1-2-4-2-1 is appended to

Trade
markets
(m)
1-2
(1, 2)
1
(1, 3)
1
(1, 4)
1
(2, 1)
0
(2, 3)
0
(2, 4)
0
(3, 1)
0
(3, 2)
0
(3, 4)
0
(4, 1)
0
(4, 2)
0
(4, 3)
1

Route 1 (r = 1)
Sailing legs (s)
2-3 3-4 4-2
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1

2-1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
0
1

1-2
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Route 2 (r = 2)
Sailing legs (s)
2-4 4-2
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0

2-1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0

consider. The value of all parameters relative to the port 3 in
the second route will be 0 because it is not visited in this loop.
The market of port 2 to port 4 is a non-stop delivery, so the
2
, is 1 and 0 for
value of corresponding parameter, α (2,4),(2,4)
others. The whole route-market-leg relationships for the example can be found in Table 4.
2. Slot Exchange Model
As noted, the carrier of using models is designated as
Company A, while its partner is Company B. For ease of
description, the following explanation will employ their roles.
Besides, container types are categorized as container sizes and
the number of types can follow the classification of Company
A. The unit of slots is counted in terms of TEU in the models.
Other symbols for variables and parameters used in the formulated models are introduced and interpreted as follows.
Variables:
xmrk = number of distributing slots in TEUs for type k container in market m required on route r.
qr
= slots in TEUs to be exchanged to Company B on
route r.
nr
= slots in TEUs to be exchanged from Company B on
route r.
π r = a switch variable to represent exchanged slots from or
to Company B on route r, 1 denotes from the partner
and 0 otherwise.
Q
= expected TEU-days to be exchanged in the contract.
yr
= purchased slots in TEUs for the whole voyage on
route r.

Parameters:
Sr
= the set of sailing legs for route r.
r
α ms
= the route-market-leg relation parameter to represent
whether the consignments of direct trade market m
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pmk

=

k
m

c

=

wk

=

Ur
br

=
=

zr

=

tr
umk

=
=

lmk

=

er

=

can be shipped by route r and pass leg s or not, 1 for
yes and 0 otherwise.
possible revenue received per type k container to be
delivered in market m.
required costs per type k container to be delivered in
market m.
required slots in TEUs for loading type k container,
such as a 20 feet container occupies 1 TEU and a 40
feet container occupies 2 TEUs etc.
slots controlled by Company A on route r in TEUs.
maximal slots that Company B can be released on
route r in TEUs.
Company B’s possibly maximal shortage of slots on
route r in TEUs.
the cycle time of route r in days.
estimated upper bound of carrying quantities for type
k container in market m.
estimated lower bound of carrying quantities for type
k container in market m.
purchased price per TEU for whole voyage on route r.

As the discussion above for slot distribution, it is noted that
the carrier has to allocate suitable slots to various types of
containers for each trade market along with possibly carried
paths. Intuitively the capacities of a ship should be reserved
with higher priorities for those containers with higher contributions to profit generation. However, too many overlaps of
the carried paths within various markets increase the complexity of optimal allocation of slots, especially to take the slot
exchange plan of multiple lines into account.
In this section, a mathematical model is constructed to decide the optimal amount of slot exchange with Company B to
maximize Company A’s profits. The formulated model [M1]
is presented as follows.
[M1]

Max.

∑∑∑
r

k

( pmk − cmk ) xmrk

(1)

m

s.t.

∑∑ α
k

r
ms

wk xmrk ≤ U r − q r + n r

∀r , s = 1,...,| Sr |

(2)

m

nr ≤ brπ r

∀r

q r ≤ z r (1 − π r )

∀r

(3)

(4)

∑

t r nr = Q

(5)

∑

t r qr = Q

(6)

r

r

| Sr |

r
xmrk ≤ U r ∑ α sm
s =1

∀r , m, k

(7)
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∑

xmrk ≤ umk

∀m, k

(8)

∑

xmrk ≥ lmk

∀m, k

(9)

r

r

π r ∈ {0,1}; xmrk , q r , n r , Q ≥ 0 and interger

(10)

The objective function in (1) maximizes the sum of estimated possible profits of Company A from shipping various
types of containers among various trade markets. Since the
contract of slot exchange or slot purchase is always discussed after route planning or service launch, the operational
costs relative to ship sailing has to be absorbed by the carrier
as the deployed vessels type no matter the result of cooperation. Slot allocation in considering slot exchange and slot
purchase only concerns consignment revenues and container
handling costs. Therefore, this paper takes into account the
revenues that include average freight and any income from
shippers and the costs that mainly contain all container handling charges occurring on loading and discharging ports. Port
index for handling costs occurring is same as indexing by
market. Equation (2) enforces that the sum of distributed slots
on each sailing leg cannot exceed the available capacities,
including the originally controllable slots plus the exchanged
results. Equations (3) and (4) restrict each loop on exchanged
slots either from or to Company B, and exchanged slots cannot
exceed the maximal numbers that Company B could release or
its possible shortage on each route. Equations (5) and (6) limit
the numbers of exchanged TEU-days for both sides are consistent. The function of (7) is to ensure that the trade markets
without on a specific route should not be allocated any slots
on this service. Equations (8) and (9) constrain the allocated
slots for a specific category and trade market falling into the
range between its lower and upper bounds. If the planner can
ensure a precisely number for the demand of a trade market,
he/she can set the same value for its upper bound and lower
bound. Equation (10) represents nonnegative and integral
constraint of variables.
This model is an integer programming (IP) problem with
several distributed variables concerned with the types of containers, involved routes and trade markets. As only direct
trade markets on each line are considered, Eq. (7) will enforce
many distributed variables to be 0 directly if involved lines do
not appear too many duplicated trade markets. The number of
other integer variables is only around three times of that of
involved routes.
3. Model Allowed Slot Purchase

Slot purchase is another alternative adopted in an alliance
agreement, particularly in the situation where Company B has
had excess supply of capacities while the Company A is facing
excess demand. In practice, the decision of slot purchase
normally follows the result of slot exchange contract. However, the carrier can plan it simultaneously with the assessment
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of slot exchange when it holds enough information from the
partner. The requirement for slot capacities is driven by the
demand quantities. The carrier can adopt the slot allocation
with higher profits in consideration both methods if partner’s
situation is available. Model [M2] aims to provide the optimal
solution when partner’s conditions and slot purchase price are
given. Furthermore, slot purchase price is just able to represent the slot value in the whole context of the exchanged
contract under the current demand levels for the company. In
this section, the possibility of slot purchase is considered and
another model [M2] is constructed as follows.
[M2]

Max.

∑∑∑
r

k

m

( pmk − cmk ) xmrk − ∑ e r y r

(11)

r

s.t.

∑∑ α
k

r
sm

wk xmrk ≤ U r − q r + n r + y r ∀r , s = 1,...,| Sr |

(12)

m

y r + nr ≤ br

∀r

(13)

y r ≥ 0 and integer

(14)

(3) ~ (10)

The objective function of (11) maximizes the sum of profits from the possible carried containers after deducting the
costs of slot purchase. Equation (12) replaces (2) to append
the available slots from purchases. To the partner the available
sold slots must be the left ones from the exchange contract.
Equation (13) make the sum of partner’s exchanged and sold
slots on each line less than or equal to the maximal that it can
release. Equation (14) is nonnegative and integral constraint
for slot purchase variables. The structure of [M2] is similar as
[M1] but increases the number of involved lines of variables
and constraints. These two models can be solved by employing many commercial software packages for mathematical programming available today.

IV. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS AND
ANALYSIS
This study used the commercial package of modelling language for mathematical programming, ILOG OPL Studio 3.5,
to generate above formulations and to solve all instances by its
embedded branch-and-bound algorithm. The relative data of
this alliance were prepared for implementing solution on the
personnel computer with the CPU of Intel Pentium 4, 2.4 GHz,
and operation system of Microsoft Windows XP.
1. Solving Results

Because Company A only took into account 20-foot and
40-foot laden containers in slot planning, this study excluded
empty and special kinds of containers. Both upper bounds of

Table 5. Comparisons of solving results between two models.
Comparison items
Number of variables
Number of constraints
Objectives ($)
Solving time (Sec.)
Slot exchanged (TEU-day)
Slots purchased (TEU)

Slot exchange
only
(Model [M1])

Slot exchange with Slot exchange and
19,250 TEU-days
slot purchase
(Model [M2])
(Model [M1])

3,353
4,858

3,352
4,858

3,361
4,866

4,079,670
2.55
18,641

4,066,760
4.64
19,250

4,234,460
1.60
5,761

0

0

919

available released slots from Company B (br) and its possibly
maximal shortage of slots (zr) are set as the current exchanged
slots plus 10% more on each involved line. This condition,
hereafter, is called the default swap allowance for distinguishing from the term of the current exchanged slots. This treatment could keep the original pattern in the contract and give
more market flexibilities for obtaining possible optimal decision. Moreover, the most and least consigned numbers of containers of the studied company for every trade market are
collected to be the upper and lower bounds of carrying quantities (umk and lmk ). The concerned costs of each container on
each trade market include handling charges at ports. The
revenues include the freight and terminal handling charge
(THC) collected from the shippers. The purchase price of a
slot is set as USD 300 for all of the routes according to
Company A’s suggestion.
This instance was solved with model [M1] considering slot
exchange and further tested the instance at fixed exchanged
TEU-days as the contract, i.e. 19,250 TEU-days. Model [M2]
was also exploited to solve this instance incorporating slot
purchase. As shown in Table 5, these cases can be obtained
their optimal solutions within 5 CPU seconds. Furthermore,
the results reveal that the studied company may reach the
highest profit when its partner is willing to sell out slots of 919
TEUs and to exchange 5,761 TEU-days. If Company B is
reluctant to sell them, then reducing the exchanged condition
to 18,641 TEU-days rather than 19,250 TEU-days will generate a better profit. These results imply the default slot purchase price of USD 300 is lower than the profit that a unit slot
might earn. Accordingly, Company A can purchase slots from
Company B as many as possible to obtain the maximal profit
under the optimal decision. In addition, the current exchanged
slots in the contract indeed could not generate the maximal
profit for Company A because of releasing too many slots for
exchange with Company B. Company A, in fact, has the potential to strive for more consignments as long as Company B
is ready to release capacities as Company A’s willingness.
From the exchanged status of each line shown in Table 6, in
merely consideration of slot exchange, Company A is able to
release a few more slots to its partner on lines A1 and A3 but to
reserve more to be used for its own on line A2. Moreover, the
company can seek more exchanges than the current contract
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Table 6. Comparisons of current slot control and results of model solution.
Unit: TEUs

Company
A

Company
B

Original control
Line

A1
A2
A3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8

Company Company
A
B
1100
0
1100
0
1100
0
275
825
275
825
0
1100
0
850
500
250

Current contract
B swap
to A

275
125
275
100
100

A swap
to B
425
240
90
0
0

0

Model [M1]
B swap
to A

302
131
302
109
0

Table 7. Allocated ratios of slot allocation for satisfying
carrying demands.
Model
[M1]

Meet with the lower
bound
Meet with the upper
20-foot
bound
Fall between lower
and upper bounds
Meet with the lower
bound
Meet with the upper
40-foot
bound
Fall between lower
and upper bounds

33
(15.8%)
171
(82.2%)
4
(2.0%)
35
(16.8%)
169
(81.2%)
4
(2.0%)

Model [M1]
with 19,250
TEU-days
51
(24.5%)
154
(74.1%)
3
(1.4%)
80
(38.4%)
115
(55.4%)
13
(6.2%)

Model
[M2]
28
(13.4%)
176
(84.6%)
4
(2.0%)
25
(12.0%)
177
(85.1%)
6
(2.9%)

100

Objective

USD

Container Number and ratio for
size
allocation

A swap
to B
436
130
99
0
0

Model [M1] with
19,250 TEU-days
B swap
A swap
to A
to B
467
196
98
302
0
137
0
302
110
20
0

4,100,000
4,095,000
4,090,000
4,085,000
4,080,000
4,075,000
4,070,000
4,065,000
4,060,000
4,055,000
4,050,000

Model [M2]
B swap
to A

0
0
302
73
0

A swap
to B
181
0
99
0
0

0

TEU-days exchanged
22,000
21,000
20,000
19,000
18,000

TEU-day

Main
operator

17,000
16,000
-20%
-10%
0%
+10%
+20%
Added percent for swap allowances from Compant B

15,000

Fig. 2. Influences of swap allowances on objective and TEU-day.

the more the objective value, the higher the ratios of meeting
with the upper bounds in slot allocation. It makes sense at the
input-output verification for the validity of our proposed
models.
2. Analysis for Swap Allowance

on lines B4, B5, B6 and B7 if possible. Obviously, Company
A had less carrying requirement on line B8, and should release
some controlled capacities rather than to acquire more. From
this analysis, we conclude that lines A2 and B4 to B7 are of
lacking slots but lines A1, A3 and B8 were of having extra
ones to the studied company. Combining with the possibility
of slot purchase, Company A can obtain slots as many as possible in terms of this way at the current price. Slot exchange
can only take lines A1, A3, B6 and B7 into account.
Among the 208 O-D pairs, solving results show that
Company A can provide almost port pairs the most slot ratios
reaching their demand upper bounds for 20-foot and 40-foot
containers. Using [M1] and [M2] models can exceed 80%, but
these ratios decrease to 74.1% and 55.4% respectively at fixing TUE-days with 19,250 for solving Model [M1]. Only less
than 7.0% of port pair demands are satisfied falling between
lower and upper bounds in all solving cases. Other parts are
those which can satisfy the lower bounds at least. This analysis
is displayed in Table 7. In the comparison of Tables 7 and 5,

In this section we further examine the influences of the
swap allowances from Company B (i.e. br and zr) to the objective and exchanged TEU-days. The extension range is from
20% downward to 20% upward of the default swap allowance.
Solving with the model [M1], the maximal profit and the
exchanged TEU-days are positively associated with adjustments of the swap allowances as shown in Fig. 2. When the
swap allowances increase, the maximal profit and the optimal
exchanged TEU-days will increase as well. However, the
increased margin is larger at the swap allowance is lower 10%
than the default value, i.e. the current exchanged slots in the
contract, and is smaller at exceeding it.
Note that it is infeasible when reducing the swap allowance
to 30% less than the default value because the least slot demands on some trade markets of the company can not be satisfied at such low allowance level. Company A indeed needs
slot exchanges to support its strong market demand for chasing more benefits by courtesy of more swap allowances from
Company B.
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Objective

Objective for keeping default swap allowance

USD

4,090,000
4,085,000
4,080,000
4,075,000
4,070,000
4,065,000
4,060,000
4,055,000
4,050,000
4,045,000
4,040,000
12,250

USD

Objective for keeping default swap allowance plus 10% more

TEU-days exchanged

4,250,000

20,000

4,200,000

15,000

4,150,000

10,000

4,100,000
4,050,000

5,000

4,000,000

0

TEU-day

Objective for keeping default swap allowance minus 10%

300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
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Unit price of slot purchase (USD/TEU)
13,650

15,050

16,450 17,850 19,250
TEU-days exchanged

20,650

22,050

Fig. 4. Sensitivity analysis of slot purchase price.

Fig. 3. Fixed exchanged TEU-days analysis for various swap allowances.

3. Fixed TEU-Days Analysis
In practice, the bargain results for slot exchange with the
partner are normally different from the company’s initial plan
because the partner’s intention could not be predicted precisely in advance. This section aims to explore the optimal
profit levels for Company A with various fixed TEU-days.
The number of exchanged TEU-days is upward and downward
from 19,270 by a scale of 700 TEU-days at a time. It is noted
that the number of TEU-days must be the multiples of 7 because of weekly service on each line. Three levels of swap
allowance are considered, i.e. the default number and 10% less
and 10% more of that.
At the case of default swap allowance, the results show that
the profits in model [M1] are almost the same between 14,350
and 18,550 TEU-days (see Fig. 3). However, the profit generated by the current contracted exchanged TEU-days of
19,250 is lower than that. Other two cases show that the
greater is the swap allowance the higher is the profit. In addition, the change pattern of profits with various TEU-days in
these two cases is same as the first one. Obviously, the range
of TEU-days with maximal profits becomes lager as the swap
allowance increases. When TEU-days fall below this range,
the profit will gradually increase as it increases. On the other
side, the profits sharply decrease when TEU-days increase and
no feasible solution exists at TEU-days larger than a certain
number. The critical numbers in three cases are 19,250, 20,650
and 22,750 TEU-days, respectively.
The curves in Fig. 3 are of meaningfulness for the studied
company because involved lines are all restricted within the
short sea services in Asia. The differences of unit profits for
the same category of laden containers in various trade markets
are slight. This analysis suggests that Company A could easily
adjust the slot allocation to obtain the better profits for a fixed
number of exchanged TEU-days. Certainly, the incremental
margin would be moderated when the enforced exchanged
TEU-days are lower than the critical one. Contrarily, the profit
will rapidly loose due to the slot resources are wasted to exchange with Company B rather than to load the boxes with
actual incomes. If the wastes are spreading more, ship’s slots
cannot afford to satisfy the least carrying demand finally. This

analysis is valuable for the Company A to realize the suitable
levels of exchanged TEU-days and critical edge of slot resources.
4. Price Analysis for Slot Purchase

Model [M2] considers slot purchase in the slot exchange
agreement to reflect the value of unit slot resource for Company A. It shows, in section of solving results, that the suggested slot purchase price of USD 300 is lower than the operating value of Company A’s own and can contribute to an
increase in profit for it at a decrease in exchanged TEU-days.
This result implies that the studied company should purchase
slots as many as possible from Company B rather than executing slot exchange. Rationally, if Company B realized the
market value of unit slot to Company A, it might not sell any
slot at this price for the reason of competition unless this deal
also benefits Company B.
Accordingly, we carried out a price sensitivity analysis to
find out the acceptable level of slot purchase price for Company A. Additional USD 50 is added to the unit purchase price
at a time for analysis. As shown in Fig. 4, the profits reduce as
the unit price increases because of extra expenses of purchasing, and the decrement is diminishing. On the other hand,
the number of exchanged TEU-days increases associated with
an increase in unit purchase price, but there is an abrupt lift of
exchanged TEU-days at the prices between USD 550 and 600
following a smooth change path. When the purchase price
reaches USD 850, the solution does not appear any purchased
slot. The critical price locates at USD 841 through further
tests. It is found that Company A does not adopt slot purchase
policy any more when the unit purchased price is over it. This
price could be a reference in pricing slots sold to its partner or
other carriers. If Company A could sell the slot with the price
higher than this one, it rather did than operated by self. Note
that the critical price of Company B is not the same as this
price because its demands on these lines are different.
We further explored the critical purchase prices for Company A in terms of five swap allowances from Company B.
As shown in Table 8, the critical purchase price rises as the
swap allowance increased, but the range is nearly small at the
allowance enlarged more than the default case. The profits
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Table 8. Critical purchase prices of the unit slot under
various swap allowances.
Swap
allowance

Critical purchase
price
(USD/TEU)

Objective
(USD)

TEU-days
exchanged
(TEU-day)

-20%
-10%
Default
+10%
+20%

781
800
841
845
846

4,056,080
4,069,910
4,079,670
4,088,380
4,096,610

13,384
17,150
18,641
18,088
17,688

increase but with a diminishing tendency. However, the exchanged TEU-days do not show an increasing path when the
swap allowance is larger than the default case.
The critical purchase price would be regarded as the value
of unit slot for the studied company only executing slot exchange. Optimal slot allocation tends to shift slot resources to
the most usage for obtaining the maximal profit. Since the
profits are growing as the flexibility of exchange increases, the
slot value still grows. Exchanged TEU-days reflect the adjustments of slot allocation according to the slot availabilities
of each line. When the swap allowance is enlarged to 10%
more than the default case, slot allocation has more effective
results so that the numbers of TEU-days exchanged can be
reduced.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS
Under alliance co-operation, carrier’s decision-making in
how to execute slot exchange with its partners is an important
part of its slot allocation plan, which links to company’s profitability. Based on an operating slot exchange contract between two carriers, this study has contributed two models
aiming to assist carrier distributing slots in optimal slot exchange and with consideration of slot purchase for the involved
lines. These models could also generate results revealing
which lines should release capacities or swap slots according
to the estimated demands of direct trade markets. Hence, they
can be extendedly applied to a survey regarding which lines
should be involved in the alliance contract.
Important findings of this study in respective of slot allocation in the slot exchange alliance are concluded as follows.
1. In the short sea services, the optimal profits from various
slot exchanges appeared to be the same within a range of
exchanged TEU-days. The increment margin of profits was
moderated as exchanged TUE-days increases and less than
the range. However, the profits rapidly decreased as the
exchanged TEU-days went beyond the critical range until
no way to satisfy the least carrying demand because of slot
resources wasting on exchange conditions.
2. Swap allowance levels released from the partner dominated
the context of slot exchange. Given a strong carrying de-
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mand, the profits and exchanged TEU-days positively associated with the change of swap allowances.
3. Given that slot purchase was allowed and when the purchase price was lower than the profit gained from slot exchange without purchase, the studied company would have
a better profit by adopting a slot exchange and purchase
strategy.
4. The critical slot purchase price reflected the maximal profit
that the unit slot could be earned from the studied carrier’s
viewpoint. It could be a valuable reference given to the
studied company when considering selling in slots to its
partner or others.
This paper dealt with a practical case. The test cases only
focused on the scale of the introduction in Section II. No
matter the report in Table 5 or other cases in sensitivity analysis, the commercial optimization package could solve them in
efficiency. In theory, future studies can consider developing
effective algorithm that can handle the larger cases in rational
time.
Slot allocation planning is a vital issue of slot management
in liner’s practical operations. It becomes more complicated
especially after permeating alliance operations as the different
characteristics of each kind. The slot exchange contract presented in this research is only a specific case between the
studied carrier and its partner. Different alliance agreement
and more involved parties will lead to more valuable study
topics for researchers. Moreover, models presented in this
research are based on the standpoint of one participant. Some
data regarding the partner must be ready in hand. If liner
carrier would apply to it, these parameters could be collected
in the process of bargaining and modified gradually. In the
future research, the win-win models can be developed on the
basis of mutual agreement.
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